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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64560 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race which can result in an UAF: sys_timer_delete() exec() posix_cpu_timer_del() // Observes old leader p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread() switch_leader(); release_task(old_leader) __exit_signal(old_leader) sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand); posix_cpu_timers*_exit(); sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader); sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL; unlock(sighand); (p->sighand == NULL) unlock(sh) return NULL; // Returns without action if(!sighand) return 0; free_posix_timer(); This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited. As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results in an UAF. There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is allocated on the stack. Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops to expire. While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem: posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr) __exit_signal(p) posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p); unhash_task(p); p->sighand = NULL; sh = lock_task_sighand(p) sighand = p->sighand; if (!sighand) return NULL; lock(sighand); if (!sh) WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr)); On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false positive. Solve these issues by: 1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release(). 2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path of lock_task_sighand(). 3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the task lookup and only if that fails it gives up. 4) Using that helper in the three affected functions. #1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() and the ones in unhash_task(). #3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand == NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios the subsequent lookup fails. When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible. The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader. commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2022-4994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: wean fast IN from emulator_pio_in Use __emulator_pio_in() directly for fast PIO instead of bouncing through emulator_pio_in() now that __emulator_pio_in() fills "val" when handling in-kernel PIO. vcpu->arch.pio.count is guaranteed to be '0', so this a pure nop. emulator_pio_in_emulated is now the last caller of emulator_pio_in. No functional change intended. | ||||
| CVE-2022-3566 | 2 Linux, Redhat | 5 Kernel, Linux Kernel, Enterprise Linux and 2 more | 2026-07-30 | 4.6 Medium |
| A vulnerability was identified in Linux Kernel up to 4.19.316/5.4.278/5.10.220/5.15.161. This impacts the function tcp_getsockopt/tcp_setsockopt of the component TCP Handler. Such manipulation leads to race condition. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vulnerability was introduced in 2.6.12, commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2"). Upgrading to version 4.19.317, 5.4.279, 5.10.221, 5.15.162 and 6.1 will fix this issue. The name of the patch is fcd31dd8291b23d713245947ec2b2d99ef07aef2/3b32f265805a49071e2c4568a524398ba22bf93c/d529193eae979a7bf2255cd9fe68b7af7a1c91b3/5bb642cc3355ffd3c8bca0a8bd8e6e65bcc2091c/f49cd2f4d6170d27a2c61f1fecb03d8a70c91f57. The affected component should be upgraded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64559 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pkey: Check length in PKEY_VERIFYPROTK ioctl Explicitly check the buffer length request structure provided by user-space and fail, if it exceeds the buffer size. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64558 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/pkey: Check length in pkey_pckmo handler implementation Explicitly check the length of the target buffer in the pkey_pckmo implementation of the key_to_protkey() handler function. The handler function fails, if the generated output data exceeds the length of the provided target buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64557 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() returned l2cap_pi(sk)->chan after release_sock(parent). Once the parent lock is dropped the newly enqueued child socket sk is reachable via the accept queue, so another task can accept and free it before the callback dereferences sk, resulting in a use-after-free. Rework the ->new_connection() op so the core, rather than the callback, owns the child channel's lifetime. The op now receives a pre-allocated new_chan and returns an errno instead of allocating and returning a channel. l2cap_new_connection() allocates the child channel and links it into the conn list via __l2cap_chan_add() before invoking the callback, so the conn-list reference keeps the channel alive once release_sock(parent) exposes the socket to other tasks. Channel configuration that was duplicated in l2cap_sock_init() and the various new_connection callbacks is consolidated into l2cap_chan_set_defaults(), which now inherits from the parent channel when one is supplied. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64556 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from the context with DETACH_EXIT only. This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid group leader on the PMU context active lists. A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU context active list. With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in merge_sched_in(). Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves the context. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64555 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: arm64: nv: Fix SPSR_EL2 restore in kvm_hyp_handle_mops() kvm_hyp_handle_mops() resets the single-step state machine as part of rewinding state for a MOPS exception by modifying vcpu_cpsr() and writing the result directly into hardware. In the case of nested virtualization, vcpu_cpsr() is a synthetic value such that the rest of KVM can deal with vEL2 cleanly. That means the value requires translation before being written into hardware, which is unfortunately missing from the MOPS handler. Fix it by directly modifying SPSR_EL2 and avoiding the synthetic state altogether, which will be resynchronized on the next 'full' exit back to KVM. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64554 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: bridge: fix stale prevhdr pointer in br_ip6_fragment() br_ip6_fragment() gets prevhdr, a pointer into the skb head, from ip6_find_1stfragopt(), then calls skb_checksum_help(). For a cloned skb skb_checksum_help() reallocates the head via pskb_expand_head(), leaving prevhdr dangling. It is later dereferenced in ip6_frag_next(), causing a use-after-free write. Save prevhdr's offset before skb_checksum_help() and recompute it after, like commit ef0efcd3bd3f ("ipv6: Fix dangling pointer when ipv6 fragment"). BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip6_frag_next (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:857) Write of size 1 at addr ffff888013ff5016 by task exploit/141 Call Trace: ... kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ip6_frag_next (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:857) br_ip6_fragment (net/ipv6/netfilter.c:212) nf_ct_bridge_post (net/bridge/netfilter/nf_conntrack_bridge.c:407) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) br_forward_finish (net/bridge/br_forward.c:66) __br_forward (net/bridge/br_forward.c:115) maybe_deliver (net/bridge/br_forward.c:191) br_flood (net/bridge/br_forward.c:245) br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:229) br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:442) ... packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3114) ... do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt | ||||
| CVE-2026-64552 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: fix len check in receive_big() receive_big() bounds the device-announced length by (big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE. That is still too loose: add_recvbuf_big() sets sg[1] to start at offset sizeof(struct padded_vnet_hdr) into the first page, so the chain actually carries hdr_len + (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(padded_vnet_hdr)) + big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE bytes -- 20 bytes less than the check allows for the common hdr_len == 12 case. A malicious virtio backend can announce a len in that gap. page_to_skb() then walks one frag past the page chain, storing a NULL page->private into skb_shinfo()->frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS], which is both an out-of-bounds write past the static frag array and a NULL frag handed up the rx path. Bound len by the size add_recvbuf_big() actually advertised. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64551 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: validate STALE_COOKIE cause length before reading staleness When an ERROR chunk with a STALE_COOKIE cause is received in the COOKIE_ECHOED state, sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale() reads the 4-byte Measure of Staleness that follows the cause header: err = (struct sctp_errhdr *)(chunk->skb->data); stale = ntohl(*(__be32 *)((u8 *)err + sizeof(*err))); err is the first cause in the chunk, not the STALE_COOKIE cause that caused the dispatch, and nothing guarantees the staleness field is present. sctp_walk_errors() only requires a cause to be as long as the 4-byte header, so for a STALE_COOKIE cause of length 4 the read runs past the cause, and for a minimal ERROR chunk past skb->tail. The value is echoed to the peer in the Cookie Preservative of the reply INIT, leaking uninitialized memory. sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err() already walks to the STALE_COOKIE cause, so check its length there and pass it to sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which reads that cause instead of the first one. A STALE_COOKIE cause too short to hold the staleness field is discarded. The read is reachable by any peer that can drive an association into COOKIE_ECHOED, including an unprivileged process using a raw SCTP socket in a user and network namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64550 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qualcomm: rmnet: validate MAP frame length before ingress parsing When ingress deaggregation is disabled, rmnet_map_ingress_handler() passes the skb straight to __rmnet_map_ingress_handler(), skipping the length validation that rmnet_map_deaggregate() performs on the aggregated path. The parser then dereferences the MAP header and csum header/trailer based on the on-wire pkt_len without checking skb->len, so a short frame is read out of bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet Read of size 1 at addr ffff88801118ed00 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... rmnet_map_checksum_downlink_packet (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_map_data.c:413) __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:96) rmnet_rx_handler (drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_handlers.c:129) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6089) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6460) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2001) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) ... Factor that validation out of rmnet_map_deaggregate() into rmnet_map_validate_packet_len() and run it on the no-aggregation path too. The MAP header is bounds-checked first, since this path can receive a frame shorter than the header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64548 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: reject overflowing copy + len in bpf_msg_push_data() When the scatterlist ring is full or nearly full, bpf_msg_push_data() enters a copy fallback path and computes copy + len for the page allocation size. Since len comes from BPF with arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING and both are u32, a crafted len can wrap the sum to a small value, causing an undersized allocation followed by an out-of-bounds memcpy. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed104089a402 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) bpf_msg_push_data (net/core/filter.c:2852 net/core/filter.c:2788) bpf_prog_9ed8b5711920a7d7+0x2e/0x36 sk_psock_msg_verdict (net/core/skmsg.c:934) tcp_bpf_sendmsg (net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:421 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:584) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) Add an overflow check before the allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64547 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: net1080: validate packet_len before pad-byte access in rx_fixup For an even packet_len, net1080_rx_fixup() reads the pad byte at skb->data[packet_len] before the skb->len != packet_len check further down, and packet_len is only bounded against NC_MAX_PACKET. A malicious NetChip 1080 device can send a short frame advertising a large even packet_len (e.g. 0x4000), so the pad-byte read lands past the end of the skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in net1080_rx_fixup Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880106c83c6 by task ksoftirqd/0/14 ... net1080_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/net1080.c:384) usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3708) tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) ... Reject the frame when packet_len >= skb->len before reading. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64546 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/edid: fix OOB read in drm_parse_tiled_block() drm_parse_tiled_block() casts the DisplayID block to a struct displayid_tiled_block and reads the full fixed layout up to tile->topology_id[7] without checking block->num_bytes. The DisplayID iterator only validates the declared payload length, so a crafted EDID can advertise a tiled-display block (tag DATA_BLOCK_TILED_DISPLAY, or DATA_BLOCK_2_TILED_DISPLAY_TOPOLOGY for v2.0) with a small num_bytes at the end of a DisplayID extension. The read then runs past the end of the exact-sized kmemdup()'d EDID allocation, a heap out-of-bounds read. Reject blocks shorter than the spec's 22-byte tiled payload before reading the fixed struct, as drm_parse_vesa_mso_data() already does. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in drm_edid_connector_update Read of size 2 at addr ffff888010077700 by task exploit/147 dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 ...) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 ...) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) drm_edid_connector_update (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid.c:7581) bochs_connector_helper_get_modes (drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/bochs.c:574) drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_probe_helper.c:426) status_store (drivers/gpu/drm/drm_sysfs.c:219) ... vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:688) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740) | ||||
| CVE-2026-64545 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net, bpf: check master for NULL in xdp_master_redirect() xdp_master_redirect() dereferences the result of netdev_master_upper_dev_get_rcu() without a NULL check, but that helper returns NULL when the receiving device has no upper-master adjacency. The reach guard only checks netif_is_bond_slave(). On bond slave release bond_upper_dev_unlink() drops the upper-master adjacency before clearing IFF_SLAVE, so an XDP_TX reaching xdp_master_redirect() in that window still passes netif_is_bond_slave() while master is already NULL, and faults on master->flags at offset 0xb0: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 RIP: 0010:xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432) Call Trace: xdp_master_redirect (net/core/filter.c:4432) bpf_prog_run_generic_xdp (include/net/xdp.h:700) do_xdp_generic (net/core/dev.c:5608) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6204) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6319) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7729) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7792) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) __dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/bottom_half.h:33) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3082) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2252) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt The missing check dates back to the original code; commit 1921f91298d1 ("net, bpf: fix null-ptr-deref in xdp_master_redirect() for down master") later added the master->flags read where the fault now lands but kept the unconditional deref. Check master for NULL before use; a NULL master is treated the same as one that is not up. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64543 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix use-after-free of the discoverer in tipc_disc_rcv() bearer_disable() frees b->disc with tipc_disc_delete()'s plain kfree(), but tipc_disc_rcv() still dereferences b->disc in RX softirq under rcu_read_lock() (tipc_udp_recv -> tipc_rcv -> tipc_disc_rcv). L2 bearers are safe thanks to the synchronize_net() in tipc_disable_l2_media(), but the UDP bearer defers that call to the cleanup_bearer() workqueue, so the discoverer is freed with no grace period: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802348b728 by task poc_tipc/184 <IRQ> tipc_disc_rcv (net/tipc/discover.c:149) tipc_rcv (net/tipc/node.c:2126) tipc_udp_recv (net/tipc/udp_media.c:391) udp_rcv (net/ipv4/udp.c:2643) ip_local_deliver_finish (net/ipv4/ip_input.c:241) </IRQ> Freed by task 181: kfree (mm/slub.c:6565) bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:418) tipc_nl_bearer_disable (net/tipc/bearer.c:1001) The bearer is freed with kfree_rcu(); free the discoverer the same way. Add an rcu_head to struct tipc_discoverer and free it and its skb from an RCU callback. Because the RCU callback (tipc_disc_free_rcu) lives in module text, a call_rcu() that is still pending when the tipc module is unloaded would invoke a freed function. Add an rcu_barrier() to tipc_exit() after the bearer subsystem has been torn down, so all pending discoverer callbacks have run before the module text goes away. Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace: the TIPCv2 genl family is netnsok and its bearer commands have no GENL_ADMIN_PERM. Needs CONFIG_TIPC and CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64541 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: fix UAF in smc_cdc_rx_handler() by pinning the socket smc_cdc_rx_handler() looks up the connection by token under the link group's conns_lock, drops the lock, and then dereferences conn and the smc_sock derived from it, ending in sock_hold(&smc->sk) inside smc_cdc_msg_recv(). No reference is held across the lock release. The only reference pinning the socket while the connection is discoverable in the link group is taken in smc_lgr_register_conn() (sock_hold) and dropped in __smc_lgr_unregister_conn() (sock_put), both under conns_lock. Once the handler drops conns_lock, a concurrent close() -> smc_release() -> smc_conn_free() -> smc_lgr_unregister_conn() can drop that reference and free the smc_sock, so the handler's later sock_hold() runs on freed memory: WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:25) smc_cdc_msg_recv (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:430) smc_cdc_rx_handler (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:502) smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn (net/smc/smc_wr.c:445) tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:938) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set Only SMC-R is affected. The SMC-D receive tasklet is stopped by tasklet_kill(&conn->rx_tsklet) in smc_conn_free() before the connection is unregistered, so it cannot run concurrently with the free. Take the socket reference while still holding conns_lock, so the registration reference can no longer be the last one, and drop it once the handler is done. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64540 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usbnet: gl620a: fix out-of-bounds read in genelink_rx_fixup() genelink_rx_fixup() splits an aggregated RX frame into its individual packets, using a per-packet length taken from device-supplied data. That length is only bounded by GL_MAX_PACKET_LEN (1514); it is never compared against how many bytes were actually received. A malicious GeneLink (GL620A) device can therefore send a short URB whose header claims packet_count > 1 and a first packet of up to 1514 bytes. skb_put_data(gl_skb, packet->packet_data, size); then copies past the end of the receive buffer and hands the adjacent slab contents up the network stack, an out-of-bounds read that leaks kernel heap. No privilege is required: the path runs in the usbnet RX softirq as soon as the interface is up. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in genelink_rx_fixup (drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112) Read of size 1514 at addr ffff888011309708 by task ksoftirqd/0/14 Call Trace: ... __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105) genelink_rx_fixup (include/linux/skbuff.h:2814 drivers/net/usb/gl620a.c:112) usbnet_bh (drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:572 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1589) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) bh_worker (kernel/workqueue.c:3405) tasklet_action (kernel/softirq.c:965) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076) ... skb_pull() already verifies that the requested length fits the buffer and returns NULL otherwise. Move it ahead of the copy and check its result, so a packet that overruns the received data is rejected before it is read. Well-formed frames, whose packets are fully present, are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64539 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-30 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: eir: Fix stack OOB write when prepending the Flags AD eir_create_adv_data() builds the advertising data into a fixed-size buffer ("size", 31 for the legacy path). It may prepend a 3-byte "Flags" AD structure (LE_AD_NO_BREDR on an LE-only controller) and then copies the per-instance data without checking that it still fits: memcpy(ptr, adv->adv_data, adv->adv_data_len); tlv_data_max_len() only reserves those 3 bytes when the user-supplied flags carry a managed-flags bit, so an instance added with flags == 0 is accepted with adv_data_len up to the full buffer. At advertise time the flags are still prepended, and the memcpy() writes 3 + adv_data_len bytes into the size-byte buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) Write of size 31 at addr ffff88800a547bdc by task kworker/u9:0/65 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) eir_create_adv_data (net/bluetooth/eir.c:301) hci_update_adv_data_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1310) hci_schedule_adv_instance_sync (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:1817) hci_cmd_sync_work (net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:332) This frame has 1 object: [32, 64) 'cp' The "Flags" structure is added by the kernel, not requested by userspace, so only prepend it when it fits together with the instance advertising data; when there is no room for both, drop the flags rather than the user-provided data. Reachable by a local user with CAP_NET_ADMIN owning an LE-only controller on the legacy advertising path. | ||||