| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix UAF in smc_cdc_rx_handler() by pinning the socket
smc_cdc_rx_handler() looks up the connection by token under the link
group's conns_lock, drops the lock, and then dereferences conn and the
smc_sock derived from it, ending in sock_hold(&smc->sk) inside
smc_cdc_msg_recv(). No reference is held across the lock release.
The only reference pinning the socket while the connection is
discoverable in the link group is taken in smc_lgr_register_conn()
(sock_hold) and dropped in __smc_lgr_unregister_conn() (sock_put), both
under conns_lock. Once the handler drops conns_lock, a concurrent
close() -> smc_release() -> smc_conn_free() -> smc_lgr_unregister_conn()
can drop that reference and free the smc_sock, so the handler's later
sock_hold() runs on freed memory:
WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work
refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:25)
smc_cdc_msg_recv (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:430)
smc_cdc_rx_handler (net/smc/smc_cdc.c:502)
smc_wr_rx_tasklet_fn (net/smc/smc_wr.c:445)
tasklet_action_common (kernel/softirq.c:938)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622)
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set
Only SMC-R is affected. The SMC-D receive tasklet is stopped by
tasklet_kill(&conn->rx_tsklet) in smc_conn_free() before the connection
is unregistered, so it cannot run concurrently with the free.
Take the socket reference while still holding conns_lock, so the
registration reference can no longer be the last one, and drop it once
the handler is done. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rpmsg: core: fix race in driver_override_show() and use core helper
The driver_override_show function reads the driver_override string
without holding the device_lock. However, the store function modifies
and frees the string while holding the device_lock. This creates a race
condition where the string can be freed by the store function while
being read by the show function, leading to a use-after-free.
To fix this, replace the rpmsg_string_attr macro with explicit show and
store functions. The new driver_override_store uses the standard
driver_set_override helper. Since the introduction of
driver_set_override, the comments in include/linux/rpmsg.h have stated
that this helper must be used to set or clear driver_override, but the
implementation was not updated until now.
Because driver_set_override modifies and frees the string while holding
the device_lock, the new driver_override_show now correctly holds the
device_lock during the read operation to prevent the race.
Additionally, since rpmsg_string_attr has only ever been used for
driver_override, removing the macro simplifies the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: appleir: fix UAF on pending key_up_timer in remove()
appleir_remove() runs hid_hw_stop() before timer_delete_sync().
hid_hw_stop() synchronously unregisters the HID input device via
hid_disconnect() -> hidinput_disconnect() -> input_unregister_device(),
which drops the last reference and frees the underlying input_dev when
no userspace handle holds it open.
key_up_tick() reads appleir->input_dev and calls input_report_key() /
input_sync() on it. The timer is armed from appleir_raw_event() with
a HZ/8 (~125 ms) timeout on every keydown and key-repeat report. If a
key was pressed shortly before the device is disconnected, the timer
can fire after hid_hw_stop() has freed input_dev but before the
teardown drains it.
A simple reorder is not sufficient. Putting the timer drain first
still leaves a window where a USB URB completion (raw_event) running
during hid_hw_stop() can call mod_timer() and re-arm the timer, which
then fires after hidinput_disconnect() has freed input_dev. The same
URB-completion window also lets raw_event() reach key_up(), key_down()
and battery_flat() directly, all of which dereference
appleir->input_dev.
Introduce a 'removing' flag on struct appleir, gated by the existing
spinlock. appleir_remove() sets the flag under the lock and then
shuts down the timer with timer_shutdown_sync(), which both drains any
in-flight callback and permanently disables further mod_timer() calls.
appleir_raw_event() and key_up_tick() bail out early if the flag is
set, so no path can arm or run the timer, or dereference
appleir->input_dev, after remove() has started tearing down.
The keyrepeat and flatbattery branches of appleir_raw_event()
previously called into the input layer without holding the spinlock;
take it now so the flag check is well-defined. This incidentally
closes a pre-existing read-side race on appleir->current_key in the
keyrepeat branch.
This bug is structurally a sibling of commit 4db2af929279 ("HID:
appletb-kbd: fix UAF in inactivity-timer cleanup path") and has been
present since the driver was introduced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction
When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through
the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling
them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's
multicast hash table (mc_hash).
Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after
ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash
can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is
decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is
accessing it, a use-after-free occurs.
Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using
ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90
print_report+0x175/0x7c0
kasan_report+0x147/0x180
ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0
udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0
ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390
ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120
NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0
__netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340
process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00
__napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0
net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60
handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0
do_softirq+0x57/0x80
</IRQ>
Allocated by task 2239:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
__kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40
__ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0
do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010
ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90
do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300
Freed by task 0:
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50
__kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60
__rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220
rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190
rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0
handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_api: use RCU with deferred freeing for action lifecycle
When NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER are run concurrently it is possible to create a
race with an associated action.
Let's illustrate with CPU0 running NEWTFILTER and CPU1 running DELFILTER:
0: mutex_lock() <-- holds the idr lock
0: rcu_read_lock()
0: p = idr_find(idr, index) <-- action p is valid (RCU protects IDR)
0: mutex_unlock() <-- releases the idr lock
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index) <-- Action removed from IDR
1: mutex_unlock() <-- mutex released allowing us to delete the action
1: tcf_action_cleanup(p); kfree(p) <-- Kfrees p immediately, no deferral
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- ouch, UAF p points to freed memory
This patch fixes the race condition between NEWTFILTER and DELFILTER by
adding struct rcu_head to tc_action used in the deferral and introducing a
call_rcu() in the delete path to defer the final kfree().
Note: this is a revert of commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu")
but also modernization/simplification to directly use kfree_rcu().
Let's illustrate the new restored code path:
0: rcu_read_lock()
1: refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock() <-- refcnt 1->0, mutex held
1: idr_remove(idr, index)
1: mutex_unlock()
1: call_rcu(&p->tcfa_rcu, tcf_action_rcu_free) <-- defer kfree after grace period
0: p = idr_find(idr, index)
0: refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->tcfa_refcnt) <-- fails, refcnt already 0
1: rcu_read_unlock() <-- release so freeing can run after grace period
After CPU1 calls idr_remove(), the object is no longer reachable through the IDR.
CPU0's subsequent idr_find() will return NULL, and even if it still held a
stale pointer, the immediate kfree() is now deferred until after the RCU grace
period, so no UAF can occur. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: legousbtower: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref
l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan->conn. If
the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending,
chan->conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer
worker attempts to lock conn->lock:
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83
|
| CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full)
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
| Call Trace:
| <TASK>
| instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422
| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
| </TASK>
|
| Allocated by task 320:
| l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075
| l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452
| hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline]
| hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760
| hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline]
| hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847
| hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|
| Freed by task 322:
| hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline]
| hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736
| hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405
| hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline]
| hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679
| vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690
| __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510
| task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233
| get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810
| arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
| __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline]
| exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98
| do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
|
| The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400
| which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
| The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
| freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)
Fix it by having chan->conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via
l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and
releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn
remains alive as long as the channel exists.
A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the ch
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context
ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive
the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a
mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats:
BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001
...
Call trace:
...
schedule+0x38/0x110
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908
__mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30
mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60
msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138
pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60
ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8
handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100
handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8
...
Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and
use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler
would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: shrinker: fix shrinker_info teardown race with expansion
expand_shrinker_info() iterates all visible memcgs under shrinker_mutex,
including memcgs that have not finished ->css_online() yet.
Once pn->shrinker_info has been published, teardown must stay serialized
with expand_shrinker_info() until that memcg is either fully online or no
longer visible to iteration. Today alloc_shrinker_info() breaks that rule
by dropping shrinker_mutex before freeing a partially initialized
shrinker_info array, which may cause the following race:
CPU0 CPU1
==== ====
css_create
--> list_add_tail_rcu(&css->sibling, &parent_css->children);
online_css
--> mem_cgroup_css_online
--> alloc_shrinker_info
--> alloc node0 info
rcu_assign_pointer(C->node0->shrinker_info, old0)
alloc node1 info -> FAIL -> goto err
mutex_unlock(shrinker_mutex)
shrinker_alloc()
--> shrinker_memcg_alloc
--> mutex_lock(shrinker_mutex)
expand_shrinker_info
--> mem_cgroup_iter see the memcg
expand_one_shrinker_info
--> old0 = C->node0->shrinker_info
memcpy(new->unit, old0->unit, ...);
free_shrinker_info
--> kvfree(old0);
/* double free !! */
kvfree_rcu(old0, rcu);
The same problem exists later in mem_cgroup_css_online(). If
alloc_shrinker_info() succeeds but a subsequent objcg allocation fails,
the free_objcg -> free_shrinker_info() unwind path tears down the already
published pn->shrinker_info arrays without shrinker_mutex. The
expand_one_shrinker_info() can race with that teardown in the same way,
leading to use-after-free or double-free of the old shrinker_info.
Fix this by serializing shrinker_info teardown with shrinker_mutex, and by
keeping alloc_shrinker_info() error cleanup inside the locked section. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc()
A race condition exists in the NFC LLCP connection state machine where
the connection acceptance packet (CC) can be processed concurrently with
socket release. This can lead to a use-after-free of the socket object.
When nfc_llcp_recv_cc() moves the socket from the connecting_sockets
list to the sockets list, it does so without holding the socket lock.
If llcp_sock_release() is executing concurrently, it might have already
unlinked the socket and dropped its references, which can result in
nfc_llcp_recv_cc() linking a freed socket into the live list.
Fix this by holding lock_sock() during the state transition and list
movement in nfc_llcp_recv_cc(). After acquiring the lock, check if
the socket is still hashed to ensure it hasn't already been unlinked
and marked for destruction by the release path. This aligns the locking
pattern with recv_hdlc() and recv_disc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tp_meter: directly shut down timer on cleanup
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup() was calling timer_delete_sync() followed by
timer_delete() to guard against the timer handler re-arming itself between
the two calls. This double-deletion hack relied on the sending status being
set to 0 to suppress re-arming.
Replace both calls with a single timer_shutdown_sync(). This function both
waits for any running timer callback to complete (like timer_delete_sync())
and permanently disarms the timer so it cannot be re-armed afterwards,
making re-arming prevention unconditional and self-documenting.
The re-arming property is also required because otherwise:
1. context 0 (batadv_tp_recv_ack()) checks in
batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() if sending is still 1 -> it is
2. context 1 changes in batadv_tp_sender_shutdown() sending to 0 and in
this process forces the kthread to stop timer in
batadv_tp_sender_cleanup()
3. context 0 continues in batadv_tp_reset_sender_timer() and rearms the
timer -> but the reference for it is already gone |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: seq: Serialize UMP output teardown with event_input
seq_ump_process_event() borrows client->out_rfile.output without
synchronizing with the first-open and last-close transition in
seq_ump_client_open() and seq_ump_client_close().
The last output unuse can therefore drop opened[STR_OUT] to zero and
release the rawmidi file while an in-flight event_input callback is still
inside snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). That leaves the rawmidi substream
runtime exposed to teardown before the write path has taken its own
buffer reference.
Add a per-client rwlock for the event_input-visible output file. Publish
a newly opened output file under the write side, and hold the read side
from the output lookup through snd_rawmidi_kernel_write(). The last
output close copies and clears the visible output file under the write
side, then drops the lock and releases the saved rawmidi file. Use
IRQ-safe rwlock guards because event_input can also be reached from
atomic sequencer delivery.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
path A label: event_input path path B label: last unuse path
1. seq_ump_process_event() reads 1. seq_ump_client_close()
client->out_rfile.output. drops opened[STR_OUT] to zero.
2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1() 2. snd_rawmidi_kernel_release()
has not yet pinned runtime. closes the output file.
3. The writer continues using 3. close_substream() frees
the borrowed substream. substream->runtime.
This keeps the output substream and runtime alive for the full
event_input write while keeping rawmidi release outside the rwlock.
KASAN reproduced this as a slab-use-after-free in
snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1(), with allocation through
seq_ump_use()/snd_seq_port_connect() and free through
seq_ump_unuse()/snd_seq_port_disconnect().
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400
RIP: 0033:0x7f5528af837f
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x73/0xb0 (?:?)
print_report+0xd1/0x650 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x1a7/0x340 (?:?)
kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x64/0x200 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xf7/0x130 (?:?)
snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x9d/0x400 (?:?)
__asan_load8+0x82/0xb0 (?:?)
update_stack_state+0x1ef/0x2d0 (?:?)
snd_rawmidi_kernel_write+0x1a/0x20 (?:?)
seq_ump_process_event+0xd4/0x120 (sound/core/seq/seq_ump_client.c:82)
__snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x8a/0xe0 (?:?)
snd_seq_deliver_from_ump+0x2b2/0xd60 (?:?)
lock_acquire+0x14e/0x2e0 (?:?)
find_held_lock+0x31/0x90 (?:?)
snd_seq_port_use_ptr+0xa6/0xe0 (?:?)
__kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 (?:?)
do_raw_read_unlock+0x32/0xa0 (?:?)
_raw_read_unlock+0x26/0x50 (?:?)
snd_seq_deliver_single_event+0x45c/0x4b0 (?:?)
snd_seq_deliver_event+0x10d/0x1b0 (?:?)
snd_seq_client_enqueue_event+0x192/0x240 (?:?)
snd_seq_write+0x2cd/0x450 (?:?)
apparmor_file_permission+0x20/0x30 (?:?)
security_file_permission+0x51/0x60 (?:?)
vfs_write+0x1ce/0x850 (?:?)
__fget_files+0x12b/0x220 (?:?)
lock_release+0xc8/0x2a0 (?:?)
__rcu_read_unlock+0x74/0x2d0 (?:?)
__fget_files+0x135/0x220 (?:?)
ksys_write+0x15a/0x180 (?:?)
rcu_is_watching+0x24/0x60 (?:?)
__x64_sys_write+0x46/0x60 (?:?)
x64_sys_call+0x7d/0x20d0 (?:?)
do_syscall_64+0xc1/0x360 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx
sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and
defers to psock->saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present,
avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser's ownership of the receive
queue (commit e91de6afa81c, "bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types
with ktls").
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard. When a socket
is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is
configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready
as rx_ctx->saved_data_ready. On data arrival:
tls_data_ready -> tls_strp_data_ready -> tls_rx_msg_ready
-> saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()
-> tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink()
without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.
tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() >= full_len (stale), calls
tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and
returns with rx_ctx->strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned
(potentially freed) skb. tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that
frag_list: use-after-free.
Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context
is present, call psock->saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake
recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue
untouched. TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the
record normally through tls_sw_recvmsg(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix UAF in hci_le_create_cis_sync
hci_le_create_cis_sync() dereferences conn->conn_timeout after releasing
both rcu_read_lock() and hci_dev_lock(hdev). The conn pointer was
obtained from an RCU-protected iteration over hdev->conn_hash.list and
is not valid once these locks are dropped. A concurrent disconnect can
free the hci_conn between the unlock and the dereference, causing a
use-after-free read.
The cancellation mechanism in hci_conn_del() cannot prevent this because
hci_le_create_cis_pending() queues hci_create_cis_sync with data=NULL:
hci_cmd_sync_queue(hdev, hci_create_cis_sync, NULL, NULL);
While hci_conn_del() dequeues with data=conn:
hci_cmd_sync_dequeue(hdev, NULL, conn, NULL);
Since NULL != conn, the lookup in _hci_cmd_sync_lookup_entry() never
matches, and the pending work item is not cancelled.
Fix this by saving conn->conn_timeout into a local variable while the
locks are still held, so the stale conn pointer is never dereferenced
after unlock.
This is the same class of bug as the one fixed by commit 035c25007c9e
("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on le_read_features_complete") which
addressed the identical pattern in a different function.
This vulnerability was identified using 0sec.ai, an open-source
automated security auditing platform (https://github.com/0sec-labs). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
irq_work: Fix use-after-free in irq_work_single() on PREEMPT_RT
On PREEMPT_RT, non-HARD irq_work runs in per-CPU kthreads via
run_irq_workd(), so irq_work_sync() uses rcuwait() to wait for BUSY==0.
After irq_work_single() clears BUSY via atomic_cmpxchg(), it still
dereferences @work for irq_work_is_hard() and rcuwait_wake_up().
An irq_work_sync() caller on another CPU that enters after BUSY is cleared
can observe BUSY==0 immediately, return, and free the work before those
accesses complete — causing a use-after-free.
Fix this by wrapping run_irq_workd() in guard(rcu)() so that the entire
irq_work_single() execution is within an RCU read-side critical
section. Then add synchronize_rcu() in irq_work_sync() after
rcuwait_wait_event() to ensure the caller waits for the RCU grace period
before returning, preventing premature frees. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: tcp - use cached peer pointer in ovpn_tcp_close()
ovpn_tcp_close() loads the ovpn_socket via rcu_dereference_sk_user_data()
under rcu_read_lock(), takes a reference on sock->peer, caches the peer
pointer in a local, and drops the read lock. It then passes sock->peer
(rather than the cached local) to ovpn_peer_del(), re-dereferencing the
ovpn_socket after the RCU read section has ended.
Unlike ovpn_tcp_sendmsg(), which uses the same "load under RCU, use
after unlock" pattern but is protected by lock_sock() held across the
function, ovpn_tcp_close() runs without the socket lock: inet_release()
invokes sk_prot->close() without taking lock_sock first.
ovpn_socket_release() can therefore complete its kref_put -> detach ->
synchronize_rcu -> kfree(sock) sequence concurrently, in the window
after ovpn_tcp_close() drops rcu_read_lock() but before it dereferences
sock->peer. The synchronize_rcu() in ovpn_socket_release() protects
readers that use the dereferenced pointer inside the RCU read section,
not those that escape the pointer to a local and use it afterwards.
A reproducer follows the pattern of commit 94560267d6c4 ("ovpn: tcp -
don't deref NULL sk_socket member after tcp_close()"): trigger a peer
removal (keepalive expiration or netlink OVPN_CMD_DEL_PEER) at the same
moment userspace closes the TCP fd. That commit fixed the detach-side
of the same race window; this one fixes the close-side at a different
victim.
Tighten the entry block to read sock->peer exactly once into the cached
peer local, and route all subsequent uses (the hold check, the
ovpn_peer_del() call, and the prot->close() invocation) through that
local. sock->peer is only ever written once in ovpn_socket_new() under
lock_sock(), before rcu_assign_sk_user_data() publishes the ovpn_socket,
and is never reassigned afterwards - but the previous multi-read pattern
made that invariant implicit rather than explicit. The same multi-read
shape exists in ovpn_tcp_recvmsg(), ovpn_tcp_sendmsg(),
ovpn_tcp_data_ready() and ovpn_tcp_write_space(); those will be cleaned
up via a dedicated helper in a follow-up net-next series. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fhandle: fix UAF due to unlocked ->mnt_ns read in may_decode_fh()
may_decode_fh() accesses mount::mnt_ns without holding any locks; that
means the mount can concurrently be unmounted, and the mnt_namespace can
concurrently be freed after an RCU grace period.
This race can happens as follows, assuming that the mount point was
created by open_tree(..., OPEN_TREE_CLONE):
thread 1 thread 2 RCU
__do_sys_open_by_handle_at
do_handle_open
handle_to_path
may_decode_fh
is_mounted
[mount::mnt_ns access]
[mount::mnt_ns access]
__do_sys_close
fput_close_sync
__fput
dissolve_on_fput
umount_tree
class_namespace_excl_destructor
namespace_unlock
free_mnt_ns
mnt_ns_tree_remove
call_rcu(mnt_ns_release_rcu)
mnt_ns_release_rcu
mnt_ns_release
kfree
[mnt_namespace::user_ns access] **UAF**
Fix it by taking rcu_read_lock() around the mount::mnt_ns access, like
in __prepend_path().
Additionally, document the semantics of mount::mnt_ns, and use WRITE_ONCE()
for writers that can race with lockless readers.
This bug is unreachable unless one of the following is set:
- CONFIG_PREEMPTION
- CONFIG_RCU_STRICT_GRACE_PERIOD
because it requires an RCU grace period to happen during a syscall without
an explicit preemption.
This doesn't seem to have interesting security impact; worst-case, it could
leak the result of an integer comparison to userspace (from the level
check in cap_capable()), cause an endless loop, or crash the kernel by
dereferencing an invalid address. |
| FreeRDP before 3.22.0 contains a use-after-free vulnerability in dvcman_channel_close and dvcman_call_on_receive due to improper synchronization of channel_callback access. A malicious RDP server can trigger a race condition by sending DYNVC_DATA and DYNVC_CLOSE messages concurrently, causing heap-use-after-free in the drdynvc client thread and potentially enabling remote code execution or denial of service. |
| Oj (Optimized JSON) is a JSON parser and Object marshaller packaged as a Ruby gem. Prior to 3.17.2, Oj::Doc iterators (each_value, each_child, each_leaf) were vulnerable to a heap use-after-free. When a Ruby block yielded during iteration calls doc.close or d.close, the document's heap memory is freed while the C iterator is still running. When control returns from the block, the iterator reads from the freed region, producing a use-after-free accessible from pure Ruby. This issue has been fixed in version 3.17.2. |
