| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_oplock_break
A race condition can occur in cifs_oplock_break() leading to a
use-after-free of the cinode structure when unmounting:
cifs_oplock_break()
_cifsFileInfo_put(cfile)
cifsFileInfo_put_final()
cifs_sb_deactive()
[last ref, start releasing sb]
kill_sb()
kill_anon_super()
generic_shutdown_super()
evict_inodes()
dispose_list()
evict()
destroy_inode()
call_rcu(&inode->i_rcu, i_callback)
spin_lock(&cinode->open_file_lock) <- OK
[later] i_callback()
cifs_free_inode()
kmem_cache_free(cinode)
spin_unlock(&cinode->open_file_lock) <- UAF
cifs_done_oplock_break(cinode) <- UAF
The issue occurs when umount has already released its reference to the
superblock. When _cifsFileInfo_put() calls cifs_sb_deactive(), this
releases the last reference, triggering the immediate cleanup of all
inodes under RCU. However, cifs_oplock_break() continues to access the
cinode after this point, resulting in use-after-free.
Fix this by holding an extra reference to the superblock during the
entire oplock break operation. This ensures that the superblock and
its inodes remain valid until the oplock break completes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix oops due to non-existence of prealloc backlog struct
If an AF_RXRPC service socket is opened and bound, but calls are
preallocated, then rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() will oops because the
rxrpc_backlog struct doesn't get allocated until the first preallocation is
made.
Fix this by returning NULL from rxrpc_alloc_incoming_call() if there is no
backlog struct. This will cause the incoming call to be aborted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability
for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in
response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can
be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks.
This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU
by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard
MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if
the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If
equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt.
This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that
uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses
are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e.,
when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs
was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and
12-byte Mesh Address Extension field.
It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh
networks keep being detected and prevented.
Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being
implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the
following IEEE 802.11 presentation:
https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf
https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-protection.docx |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage
Lonial reported that an out-of-bounds access in cgroup local storage
can be crafted via tail calls. Given two programs each utilizing a
cgroup local storage with a different value size, and one program
doing a tail call into the other. The verifier will validate each of
the indivial programs just fine. However, in the runtime context
the bpf_cg_run_ctx holds an bpf_prog_array_item which contains the
BPF program as well as any cgroup local storage flavor the program
uses. Helpers such as bpf_get_local_storage() pick this up from the
runtime context:
ctx = container_of(current->bpf_ctx, struct bpf_cg_run_ctx, run_ctx);
storage = ctx->prog_item->cgroup_storage[stype];
if (stype == BPF_CGROUP_STORAGE_SHARED)
ptr = &READ_ONCE(storage->buf)->data[0];
else
ptr = this_cpu_ptr(storage->percpu_buf);
For the second program which was called from the originally attached
one, this means bpf_get_local_storage() will pick up the former
program's map, not its own. With mismatching sizes, this can result
in an unintended out-of-bounds access.
To fix this issue, we need to extend bpf_map_owner with an array of
storage_cookie[] to match on i) the exact maps from the original
program if the second program was using bpf_get_local_storage(), or
ii) allow the tail call combination if the second program was not
using any of the cgroup local storage maps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clone_private_mnt(): make sure that caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the right userns
What we want is to verify there is that clone won't expose something
hidden by a mount we wouldn't be able to undo. "Wouldn't be able to undo"
may be a result of MNT_LOCKED on a child, but it may also come from
lacking admin rights in the userns of the namespace mount belongs to.
clone_private_mnt() checks the former, but not the latter.
There's a number of rather confusing CAP_SYS_ADMIN checks in various
userns during the mount, especially with the new mount API; they serve
different purposes and in case of clone_private_mnt() they usually,
but not always end up covering the missing check mentioned above. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts
Ensure that propagation settings can only be changed for mounts located
in the caller's mount namespace. This change aligns permission checking
with the rest of mount(2). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: ensure the allocated report buffer can contain the reserved report ID
When the report ID is not used, the low level transport drivers expect
the first byte to be 0. However, currently the allocated buffer not
account for that extra byte, meaning that instead of having 8 guaranteed
bytes for implement to be working, we only have 7. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: make fallback action and fallback decision atomic
Syzkaller reported the following splat:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 __mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1244 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 check_fully_established net/mptcp/options.c:982 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7704 at net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 mptcp_incoming_options+0x21a8/0x2510 net/mptcp/options.c:1153
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 7704 Comm: syz.3.1419 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-gbd5ce2324dba #20 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1223 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_do_fallback net/mptcp/protocol.h:1244 [inline]
RIP: 0010:check_fully_established net/mptcp/options.c:982 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mptcp_incoming_options+0x21a8/0x2510 net/mptcp/options.c:1153
Code: 24 18 e8 bb 2a 00 fd e9 1b df ff ff e8 b1 21 0f 00 e8 ec 5f c4 fc 44 0f b7 ac 24 b0 00 00 00 e9 54 f1 ff ff e8 d9 5f c4 fc 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 b8 f4 ff ff e8 8b 2a 00 fd e9 8d e6 ff ff e8 81 2a 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a3f08448 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880180a8000 RCX: ffffffff84afcf45
RDX: ffff888090223700 RSI: ffffffff84afdaa7 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: ffff888017955780 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8880180a8910 R14: ffff8880a3e9d058 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00005555791b8500(0000) GS:ffff88811c495000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000110c2800b7 CR3: 0000000058e44000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_reset+0x26f/0x2b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:4432
tcp_validate_incoming+0x1057/0x1b60 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5975
tcp_rcv_established+0x5b5/0x21f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6166
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x5dc/0xa70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1925
tcp_v4_rcv+0x3473/0x44a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2363
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xba/0x480 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2f1/0x500 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
ip_local_deliver+0x1be/0x560 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:447 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:317 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:311 [inline]
ip_rcv+0x514/0x810 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:567
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x197/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5975
__netif_receive_skb+0x1f/0x120 net/core/dev.c:6088
process_backlog+0x301/0x1360 net/core/dev.c:6440
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xba/0x550 net/core/dev.c:7453
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7517 [inline]
net_rx_action+0xb44/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7644
handle_softirqs+0x1d0/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:579
do_softirq+0x3f/0x90 kernel/softirq.c:480
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xed/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:407
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
inet_csk_listen_stop+0x2c5/0x1070 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1524
mptcp_check_listen_stop.part.0+0x1cc/0x220 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2985
mptcp_check_listen_stop net/mptcp/mib.h:118 [inline]
__mptcp_close+0x9b9/0xbd0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3000
mptcp_close+0x2f/0x140 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3066
inet_release+0xed/0x200 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:435
inet6_release+0x4f/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:487
__sock_release+0xb3/0x270 net/socket.c:649
sock_close+0x1c/0x30 net/socket.c:1439
__fput+0x402/0xb70 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x150/0x240 kernel/task_work.c:227
resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd4
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in crypt_message when using async crypto
The CVE-2024-50047 fix removed asynchronous crypto handling from
crypt_message(), assuming all crypto operations are synchronous.
However, when hardware crypto accelerators are used, this can cause
use-after-free crashes:
crypt_message()
// Allocate the creq buffer containing the req
creq = smb2_get_aead_req(..., &req);
// Async encryption returns -EINPROGRESS immediately
rc = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
// Free creq while async operation is still in progress
kvfree_sensitive(creq, ...);
Hardware crypto modules often implement async AEAD operations for
performance. When crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt() returns -EINPROGRESS,
the operation completes asynchronously. Without crypto_wait_req(),
the function immediately frees the request buffer, leading to crashes
when the driver later accesses the freed memory.
This results in a use-after-free condition when the hardware crypto
driver later accesses the freed request structure, leading to kernel
crashes with NULL pointer dereferences.
The issue occurs because crypto_alloc_aead() with mask=0 doesn't
guarantee synchronous operation. Even without CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC in
the mask, async implementations can be selected.
Fix by restoring the async crypto handling:
- DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait) for completion tracking
- aead_request_set_callback() for async completion notification
- crypto_wait_req() to wait for operation completion
This ensures the request buffer isn't freed until the crypto operation
completes, whether synchronous or asynchronous, while preserving the
CVE-2024-50047 fix. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
comedi: Fix initialization of data for instructions that write to subdevice
Some Comedi subdevice instruction handlers are known to access
instruction data elements beyond the first `insn->n` elements in some
cases. The `do_insn_ioctl()` and `do_insnlist_ioctl()` functions
allocate at least `MIN_SAMPLES` (16) data elements to deal with this,
but they do not initialize all of that. For Comedi instruction codes
that write to the subdevice, the first `insn->n` data elements are
copied from user-space, but the remaining elements are left
uninitialized. That could be a problem if the subdevice instruction
handler reads the uninitialized data. Ensure that the first
`MIN_SAMPLES` elements are initialized before calling these instruction
handlers, filling the uncopied elements with 0. For
`do_insnlist_ioctl()`, the same data buffer elements are used for
handling a list of instructions, so ensure the first `MIN_SAMPLES`
elements are initialized for each instruction that writes to the
subdevice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix race condition on qfq_aggregate
A race condition can occur when 'agg' is modified in qfq_change_agg
(called during qfq_enqueue) while other threads access it
concurrently. For example, qfq_dump_class may trigger a NULL
dereference, and qfq_delete_class may cause a use-after-free.
This patch addresses the issue by:
1. Moved qfq_destroy_class into the critical section.
2. Added sch_tree_lock protection to qfq_dump_class and
qfq_dump_class_stats. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rpl: Fix use-after-free in rpl_do_srh_inline().
Running lwt_dst_cache_ref_loop.sh in selftest with KASAN triggers
the splat below [0].
rpl_do_srh_inline() fetches ipv6_hdr(skb) and accesses it after
skb_cow_head(), which is illegal as the header could be freed then.
Let's fix it by making oldhdr to a local struct instead of a pointer.
[0]:
[root@fedora net]# ./lwt_dst_cache_ref_loop.sh
...
TEST: rpl (input)
[ 57.631529] ==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rpl_do_srh_inline.isra.0 (net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c:174)
Read of size 40 at addr ffff888122bf96d8 by task ping6/1543
CPU: 50 UID: 0 PID: 1543 Comm: ping6 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-01302-gfadd1e6231b1 #23 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:409 mm/kasan/report.c:521)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:636)
kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:175 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/generic.c:189 (discriminator 1))
__asan_memmove (mm/kasan/shadow.c:94 (discriminator 2))
rpl_do_srh_inline.isra.0 (net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c:174)
rpl_input (net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c:201 net/ipv6/rpl_iptunnel.c:282)
lwtunnel_input (net/core/lwtunnel.c:459)
ipv6_rcv (./include/net/dst.h:471 (discriminator 1) ./include/net/dst.h:469 (discriminator 1) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/netfilter.h:317 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/netfilter.h:311 (discriminator 1) net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311 (discriminator 1))
__netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:5967)
process_backlog (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:869 net/core/dev.c:6440)
__napi_poll.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:7452)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7518 net/core/dev.c:7643)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480 (discriminator 20))
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:407)
__dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4740)
ip6_finish_output2 (./include/linux/netdevice.h:3358 ./include/net/neighbour.h:526 ./include/net/neighbour.h:540 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141)
ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226)
ip6_output (./include/linux/netfilter.h:306 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:248)
ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1983)
rawv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/raw.c:588 net/ipv6/raw.c:918)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:714 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:729 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:2228 (discriminator 1))
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2231)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 (discriminator 1))
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
RIP: 0033:0x7f68cffb2a06
Code: 5d e8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 19 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 11 e8 26 ff ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <48> 8b 5d f8 c9 c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 08
RSP: 002b:00007ffefb7c53d0 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000564cd69f10a0 RCX: 00007f68cffb2a06
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000564cd69f10a4 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffefb7c53f0 R08: 0000564cd6a032ac R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000564cd69f10a4
R13: 0000000000000040 R14: 00007ffefb7c66e0 R15: 0000564cd69f10a0
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1543:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:60 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/common.c:69 (discriminator 1))
__kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:319 mm/kasan/common.c:345)
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof (./include/linux/kasan.h:250 mm/slub.c:4148 mm/slub.c:4197 mm/slub.c:4249)
kmalloc_reserve (net/core/skbuff.c:581 (discriminator 88))
__alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:669)
__ip6_append_data (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1672 (discriminator 1))
ip6_
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry
A crash in conntrack was reported while trying to unlink the conntrack
entry from the hash bucket list:
[exception RIP: __nf_ct_delete_from_lists+172]
[..]
#7 [ff539b5a2b043aa0] nf_ct_delete at ffffffffc124d421 [nf_conntrack]
#8 [ff539b5a2b043ad0] nf_ct_gc_expired at ffffffffc124d999 [nf_conntrack]
#9 [ff539b5a2b043ae0] __nf_conntrack_find_get at ffffffffc124efbc [nf_conntrack]
[..]
The nf_conn struct is marked as allocated from slab but appears to be in
a partially initialised state:
ct hlist pointer is garbage; looks like the ct hash value
(hence crash).
ct->status is equal to IPS_CONFIRMED|IPS_DYING, which is expected
ct->timeout is 30000 (=30s), which is unexpected.
Everything else looks like normal udp conntrack entry. If we ignore
ct->status and pretend its 0, the entry matches those that are newly
allocated but not yet inserted into the hash:
- ct hlist pointers are overloaded and store/cache the raw tuple hash
- ct->timeout matches the relative time expected for a new udp flow
rather than the absolute 'jiffies' value.
If it were not for the presence of IPS_CONFIRMED,
__nf_conntrack_find_get() would have skipped the entry.
Theory is that we did hit following race:
cpu x cpu y cpu z
found entry E found entry E
E is expired <preemption>
nf_ct_delete()
return E to rcu slab
init_conntrack
E is re-inited,
ct->status set to 0
reply tuplehash hnnode.pprev
stores hash value.
cpu y found E right before it was deleted on cpu x.
E is now re-inited on cpu z. cpu y was preempted before
checking for expiry and/or confirm bit.
->refcnt set to 1
E now owned by skb
->timeout set to 30000
If cpu y were to resume now, it would observe E as
expired but would skip E due to missing CONFIRMED bit.
nf_conntrack_confirm gets called
sets: ct->status |= CONFIRMED
This is wrong: E is not yet added
to hashtable.
cpu y resumes, it observes E as expired but CONFIRMED:
<resumes>
nf_ct_expired()
-> yes (ct->timeout is 30s)
confirmed bit set.
cpu y will try to delete E from the hashtable:
nf_ct_delete() -> set DYING bit
__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
Even this scenario doesn't guarantee a crash:
cpu z still holds the table bucket lock(s) so y blocks:
wait for spinlock held by z
CONFIRMED is set but there is no
guarantee ct will be added to hash:
"chaintoolong" or "clash resolution"
logic both skip the insert step.
reply hnnode.pprev still stores the
hash value.
unlocks spinlock
return NF_DROP
<unblocks, then
crashes on hlist_nulls_del_rcu pprev>
In case CPU z does insert the entry into the hashtable, cpu y will unlink
E again right away but no crash occurs.
Without 'cpu y' race, 'garbage' hlist is of no consequence:
ct refcnt remains at 1, eventually skb will be free'd and E gets
destroyed via: nf_conntrack_put -> nf_conntrack_destroy -> nf_ct_destroy.
To resolve this, move the IPS_CONFIRMED assignment after the table
insertion but before the unlock.
Pablo points out that the confirm-bit-store could be reordered to happen
before hlist add resp. the timeout fixup, so switch to set_bit and
before_atomic memory barrier to prevent this.
It doesn't matter if other CPUs can observe a newly inserted entry right
before the CONFIRMED bit was set:
Such event cannot be distinguished from above "E is the old incarnation"
case: the entry will be skipped.
Also change nf_ct_should_gc() to first check the confirmed bit.
The gc sequence is:
1. Check if entry has expired, if not skip to next entry
2. Obtain a reference to the expired entry.
3. Call nf_ct_should_gc() to double-check step 1.
nf_ct_should_gc() is thus called only for entries that already failed an
expiry check. After this patch, once the confirmed bit check pas
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: always refresh the queue when reading sock
After recent changes in net-next TCP compacts skbs much more
aggressively. This unearthed a bug in TLS where we may try
to operate on an old skb when checking if all skbs in the
queue have matching decrypt state and geometry.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
(net/tls/tls_strp.c:436 net/tls/tls_strp.c:530 net/tls/tls_strp.c:544)
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888013085750 by task tls/13529
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 13529 Comm: tls Not tainted 6.16.0-rc5-virtme
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
tls_strp_check_rcv+0x898/0x9a0 [tls]
tls_rx_rec_wait+0x2c9/0x8d0 [tls]
tls_sw_recvmsg+0x40f/0x1aa0 [tls]
inet_recvmsg+0x1c3/0x1f0
Always reload the queue, fast path is to have the record in the queue
when we wake, anyway (IOW the path going down "if !strp->stm.full_len"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: vlan: fix VLAN 0 refcount imbalance of toggling filtering during runtime
Assuming the "rx-vlan-filter" feature is enabled on a net device, the
8021q module will automatically add or remove VLAN 0 when the net device
is put administratively up or down, respectively. There are a couple of
problems with the above scheme.
The first problem is a memory leak that can happen if the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled while the device is running:
# ip link add bond1 up type bond mode 0
# ethtool -K bond1 rx-vlan-filter off
# ip link del dev bond1
When the device is put administratively down the "rx-vlan-filter"
feature is disabled, so the 8021q module will not remove VLAN 0 and the
memory will be leaked [1].
Another problem that can happen is that the kernel can automatically
delete VLAN 0 when the device is put administratively down despite not
adding it when the device was put administratively up since during that
time the "rx-vlan-filter" feature was disabled. null-ptr-unref or
bug_on[2] will be triggered by unregister_vlan_dev() for refcount
imbalance if toggling filtering during runtime:
$ ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0
$ ip link add link bond0 name vlan0 type vlan id 0 protocol 802.1q
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter off
$ ifconfig bond0 up
$ ethtool -K bond0 rx-vlan-filter on
$ ifconfig bond0 down
$ ip link del vlan0
Root cause is as below:
step1: add vlan0 for real_dev, such as bond, team.
register_vlan_dev
vlan_vid_add(real_dev,htons(ETH_P_8021Q),0) //refcnt=1
step2: disable vlan filter feature and enable real_dev
step3: change filter from 0 to 1
vlan_device_event
vlan_filter_push_vids
ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid //No refcnt added to real_dev vlan0
step4: real_dev down
vlan_device_event
vlan_vid_del(dev, htons(ETH_P_8021Q), 0); //refcnt=0
vlan_info_rcu_free //free vlan0
step5: delete vlan0
unregister_vlan_dev
BUG_ON(!vlan_info); //vlan_info is null
Fix both problems by noting in the VLAN info whether VLAN 0 was
automatically added upon NETDEV_UP and based on that decide whether it
should be deleted upon NETDEV_DOWN, regardless of the state of the
"rx-vlan-filter" feature.
[1]
unreferenced object 0xffff8880068e3100 (size 256):
comm "ip", pid 384, jiffies 4296130254
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 20 30 0d 80 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 . 0.............
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc 81ce31fa):
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2b5/0x340
vlan_vid_add+0x434/0x940
vlan_device_event.cold+0x75/0xa8
notifier_call_chain+0xca/0x150
__dev_notify_flags+0xe3/0x250
rtnl_configure_link+0x193/0x260
rtnl_newlink_create+0x383/0x8e0
__rtnl_newlink+0x22c/0xa40
rtnl_newlink+0x627/0xb00
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fb/0xb70
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350
netlink_unicast+0x426/0x710
netlink_sendmsg+0x75a/0xc20
__sock_sendmsg+0xc1/0x150
____sys_sendmsg+0x5aa/0x7b0
___sys_sendmsg+0xfc/0x180
[2]
kernel BUG at net/8021q/vlan.c:99!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 382 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #61 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:unregister_vlan_dev (net/8021q/vlan.c:99 (discriminator 1))
RSP: 0018:ffff88810badf310 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810da84000 RCX: ffffffffb47ceb9a
RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88810e8b43c8
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6cefe80
R10: ffffffffb677f407 R11: ffff88810badf3c0 R12: ffff88810e8b4000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810642a5c0 R15: 000000000000017e
FS: 00007f1ff68c20c0(0000) GS:ffff888163a24000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f1ff5dad240 CR3: 0000000107e56000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: Revert to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes
Jann reports that uprobes can be used destructively when used in the
middle of an instruction. The kernel only verifies there is a valid
instruction at the requested offset, but due to variable instruction
length cannot determine if this is an instruction as seen by the
intended execution stream.
Additionally, Mark Rutland notes that on architectures that mix data
in the text segment (like arm64), a similar things can be done if the
data word is 'mistaken' for an instruction.
As such, require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU
Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport
from becoming a stale pointer.
This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();
add a lockdep assert.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600
Call Trace:
vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40
__sys_connect+0xe8/0x100
__x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
atm: clip: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in to_atmarpd().
atmarpd is protected by RTNL since commit f3a0592b37b8 ("[ATM]: clip
causes unregister hang").
However, it is not enough because to_atmarpd() is called without RTNL,
especially clip_neigh_solicit() / neigh_ops->solicit() is unsleepable.
Also, there is no RTNL dependency around atmarpd.
Let's use a private mutex and RCU to protect access to atmarpd in
to_atmarpd(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Reject SEV{-ES} intra host migration if vCPU creation is in-flight
Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM
is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the
section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of
vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs
in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in
the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an
SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU.
The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's
NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024
RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline]
RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline]
RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline]
RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067
Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0
RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169
svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396
kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline]
kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490
kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895
kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310
kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369
__fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465
task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline]
do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953
do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102
get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969
</TASK>
Modules linked in: gq(O)
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
CR2: ffffebde00000000
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing
the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware.
E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a
bogus VMSA page. Accessing P
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt_en: Set DMA unmap len correctly for XDP_REDIRECT
When transmitting an XDP_REDIRECT packet, call dma_unmap_len_set()
with the proper length instead of 0. This bug triggers this warning
on a system with IOMMU enabled:
WARNING: CPU: 36 PID: 0 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:842 __iommu_dma_unmap+0x159/0x170
RIP: 0010:__iommu_dma_unmap+0x159/0x170
Code: a8 00 00 00 00 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 c7 45 c8 00 00 00 00 48 c7 45 a0 ff ff ff ff 4c 89 45
b8 4c 89 45 c0 e9 77 ff ff ff <0f> 0b e9 60 ff ff ff e8 8b bf 6a 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ff22d31181150c88 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000002000 RBX: 00000000e13a0000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ff22d31181150cf0 R08: ff22d31181150ca8 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ff22d311d36c9d80 R12: 0000000000001000
R13: ff13544d10645010 R14: ff22d31181150c90 R15: ff13544d0b2bac00
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff13550908a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005be909dacff8 CR3: 0008000173408003 CR4: 0000000000f71ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
? __warn+0x89/0x160
? __iommu_dma_unmap+0x159/0x170
? report_bug+0x17e/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
? __iommu_dma_unmap+0x159/0x170
? __iommu_dma_unmap+0xb3/0x170
iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x4f/0x100
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x52/0x220
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? xdp_return_frame+0x2e/0xd0
bnxt_tx_int_xdp+0xdf/0x440 [bnxt_en]
__bnxt_poll_work_done+0x81/0x1e0 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_poll+0xd3/0x1e0 [bnxt_en] |
